Iran is one of the countries that produces nuclear energy through its development programs and adequate infrastructure. However this progress was hampered by Stuxnet cyber attack in 2010. This thesis aims to explaincomprehensively on how Clausewitz analysis be applied focusing on theconcept of “friction” and “fog of war” to driving understanding the Stuxnetcyber attack on cyber warfare against Iran’s nuclear programme and theimpact of the Stuxnet attack on the Iran's nuclear programme and Iran’s cyber security. This study employs qualitative research method usingcontent of analysis with interview and literature review as data collection.The study’s findings reveal that Stuxnet attack not only disrupted Iran’s nuclear ambitions but also set a precendent in the use of cyber tools for strategic military objectives. The understanding of Stuxnet cyber attackthrough Clausewitzian analysis involves considering the uncertainties, lackof clarity, and challenges associated with the operation. Additionally, theimpacts of Stuxnet attack involve Iran’s nuclear program after Stuxnetattack, impact on nuclear negotiations, and increased cyber security measures. This thesis has recommendations as follows: to explore theevolution of cyber warfare tactics in further research, develop adaptive cyber strategies, and invest in cyber defense and security and resilience.